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Abstract

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was instated in response to extensive audit failures and
the resulting lack of confidence in the American public market. However, the regulations
can be costly and small-capital and foreign companies are seeking to be exempt from the
regulations altogether. Through extensive research, I have determined the validity of
these arguments and the possible effects of these companies not complying with
Sarbanes-Oxley. I have found that while there are initial costs incurred to meet the
regulation requirements, the benefits to the public market, investors, and the companies
themselves outweigh them considerably. I have documented this evidence and also given
tips on creating the most value out of Sarbanes-Oxley in the most cost-effective manner.
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The Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on Small-Capital and Foreign Corporations
In 2002, Congress passed an Act that imposed tremendous changes to corporate
America. The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,
generally referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was established with the most honorable
of intentions (Agami, 2006). After the horrific Enron scandal, Congress sought to protect
investors from fraudulent executives and dishonest auditors by refining the regulations of
corporate financial reporting and practices. While the benefits of the Act are evident,
Congress admits that the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley regulations are higher
than expected (Swartz, 2005). Foreign and small-capital companies are feeling the
excess cost burden more than anyone. Many corporations are arguing that these types of
companies should be exempt from the regulations altogether (Braddock, 2006). They
claim that the costs of implementing the reforms are much higher than the benefits they
produce. However, evidence suggests that, when implemented properly and as Congress
intended, the benefits will far outweigh the initial cost burden and its goal of protecting
investors and strengthening the public market will be accomplished. While the costs of
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley are significant and occasionally burdensome on small
and foreign companies, I will attempt to prove that increased costs is not an adequate
reason to be exempt from the regulations as trust in financial reporting needs to be
restored and investor confidence regained.
In order to establish a basis for my theory, I will first present the reasons behind
the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley. This will show the purpose and goals outlined in
the Act and give us a basis for determining its benefits. I will also give an overview of
the regulations established by SOX in order to explain the portions of the Act critics are
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complaining about. I will then proceed to individually examine the main arguments
against Sarbanes-Oxley’s affects on small and foreign companies. In doing so, I will
prove that their arguments are not valid and the positives outweigh the negatives. Lastly,
I will give tips on utilizing the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations in such a way that small
companies can reap tremendous benefit.
Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Was Established
While Sarbanes-Oxley might have been created and implemented rather quickly,
the concept of revamping the regulations placed on financial reporting of publicly traded
companies was not thought up overnight. Many factors influenced its establishment.
The prevalence of fraud in financial reporting was a major contributing factor (Tackett,
2004). Another was the evidence that auditors had forgotten their responsibility as public
watchdogs which gave way to pervasive audit failure (Braddock, 2006).
Fraud in Corporate America
The entrance into the 21st century will be forever marred by the scandals that cost
investors billions of dollars in lost value. Large corporations like Enron, Tyco,
WorldCom, and Adelphia were discovered to have disastrous frauds within their financial
accounting procedures. This resulted in a public market where investors were terrified of
losing their financial stability to greedy executives and accountants. The accounting
profession came under extreme scrutiny as the press began to reveal the absolute absence
of integrity in many well-known audit firms. For example, the investigation of the Enron
scandal revealed that its auditor, Arthur Andersen, had shredded audit documents in order
to hide any evidence of the fraud it was perpetrating. The investigation also revealed that
Arthur Andersen was paid an elaborate $25 million dollars in audit fees and another $27

Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley 6
million in consulting fees (Tackett, 2004). According to a study by a prominent
accounting firm, an estimated 20% of every dollar earned by a company is lost due to
some type of workplace fraud (Cherry, 2004). This exposure not only raised questions
within the SEC, it destroyed any thread of confidence investors had in the financial
reporting of publicly owned companies.
Audit Failure
Another reason Sarbanes-Oxley was needed was because auditors were working
for the executive board rather than for the investors. Economists Luigi Zingales,
Alexander Dyck, and Adair Morse performed a study of corporate frauds and found that
the majority of frauds reported in the US were not reported by the auditors but rather by
employees of the companies. Only one-third of corporate frauds reviewed in their study
were discovered and reported by auditors – the people who are responsible for
uncovering fraud (Grumet, 2007). This revealed prevalent audit failure.
According to the Managerial Auditing Journal, there are four root causes of audit
failure (Tackett, 2004). The first is auditor blunders caused by unintentional human
error. The second is auditor fraud. The next is undue influence caused by financial
interests. This was becoming very common as auditors were being offered lucrative
bonuses and charging extravagant audit fees in exchange for having a blind eye to
improper business practices. Lastly, audit failure is caused by undue influence caused by
personal auditor-client relationships. Auditor independence was lost as auditors were
golf buddies or family relatives with the clients they audited. These situations
jeopardized the quality of audit reporting and led to audit failure.
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Transparency of Financial Statements
With the increase in fraud and the realization that the independence of auditors
had become a long-forgotten concept, the SEC realized that the financial statements of
companies were becoming ineffectual (Tackett, 2004). There was no way to look at them
and see an actual depiction of a company’s financial standing. Investors had no way of
knowing whether the asset and liability figures they were given were even remotely close
to being accurate. Therefore, a major goal of Sarbanes-Oxley was to provide transparent
financial reports to investors.
Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations
The purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is “to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and
for other purposes” (Braddock, 2006, p. 177). There are many provisions that aid in
fulfilling this purpose. First, the act established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. This board essentially audits the auditing companies. They establish
auditing rules and enforce regulation compliance. This board falls under the jurisdiction
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Auditor Independence
Another provision limits the duties of the auditor in order to strengthen the
independence of public auditors. It is now unlawful for auditors to perform both
consulting and auditing services for the same company. This aids in deterring fraudulent
management practices. Also, companies must switch to a new lead audit partner every
five years. This helps maintain independence between auditors and company
management.

Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley 8
Sarbanes-Oxley sought to make auditors realize their duty of providing investors
with a clear depiction of a company’s financial position rather than seeking to please
greedy executives. Chief Justice Burger states:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This “public
watchdog” function demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
(Braddock, 2006, p. 182)

This “public watchdog” role helps to prevent the concealing of deceptive practices of
management by auditors who fear the risk of losing their prosperous client.
Verification of Financial Statement Accuracy
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial
Officers to verify the accuracy of financial statements. If illegal behavior is detected
regarding the laws requiring a company to restate their financial reports, the CEO and
CFO will be required to repay any bonuses or profits received in conjunction with the
offense. This places responsibility on management to ensure accurate and legitimate
reports of financial standing. Also, companies are required to have a “financial expert”
on the auditing committee or provide an explanation for their lack of such an expert
(Carney, 2006, p. 145).
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Code of Ethics
Corporations are also required to adopt a code of ethics for senior financial
officers. Any company that does not adopt a code must report its failure to comply and
give an explanation as to why. Although a stated code of ethics is not a guarantee that
corporate management will adhere to its contents at all times, it is a form of
accountability. It can be used to hold those responsible who violate the code’s contents.
Section 404
One of the most debated provisions of the Act is Section 404 which deals with
internal control procedures. The PCAOB defines internal control over financial reporting
as,
A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the company's principal
executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar
functions, and effected by the company's board of directors, management, and
other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of
financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and
includes those policies and procedures that: (1) Pertain to the maintenance of
records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the company; (2) Provide reasonable assurance that
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that
receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance with
authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) Provide
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reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized
acquisition, use or disposition of the company's assets that could have a material
effect on the financial statements. (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
2004)
Under Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, every publicly traded company is required to assess
the effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting. This requires two
stipulations:
1) A statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining an
adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting
2) Management’s assessment, as of the end of the company’s most recent fiscal year,
of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting (Swartz, 2005, p. 23)

These requirements often necessitate external consulting services in order to properly
establish internal control procedures. Under Section 404 auditors must also verify and
report on management’s evaluation of the effectiveness of the company’s internal
controls and procedures for financial reporting in accordance with the standards set forth
by Sarbanes-Oxley.
Significant deficiency and material weakness.
When evaluating internal control, company management and the internal auditor
must determine the probability and size of a potential financial misstatement. When a
problem is recognized, management and the internal auditor must determine whether it is
a significant deficiency or a material weakness (Agami, 2006). The PCAOB defines
significant deficiency as
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A control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that adversely affects
the company's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report external
financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of
the company's annual or interim financial statements that is more than
inconsequential will not be prevented or detected (Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 2004).
It also defines material weakness as “a significant deficiency, or combination of
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material
misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or
detected” (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2004). This determination
should be considered using the materiality principle. If a significant control deficiency is
detected, it must be disclosed to the company’s audit committee as well as external
auditors. If a material control weakness is detected, it must be disclosed to the public via
its periodic financial statements filed with the SEC (Gupta, 2006).
Arguments Against the Implementation of SOX in Small-Capital Companies
Since the inception of Sarbanes-Oxley, there have been numerous critics of its
existence. A lot of the arguments have been directed towards the Act’s effects on smallcapital and foreign companies. Some say that Sarbanes-Oxley has damaged the
American economy by making companies scared to list on our markets. Others also say
that companies are not as willing to take necessary business risks because of the possible
implications from these regulations. The majority of critics say that the costs incurred in
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order to comply with the regulations are too burdensome and not worth the effort
(Grumet, 2007).
Affect on Companies Choosing to List on the American Market
Many critics argue that the extensive regulations required by Sarbanes-Oxley will
hinder foreign companies from listing on our market. While it is useful to have foreign
companies listed on our stock exchange in order to offer investors a diversified portfolio
and keep the market competitive, there has not been substantial evidence to show that
SOX is significantly hindering their participation in the American market. As stated in
the CPA Journal, “The United states currently controls 45% of global mutual fund assets
and 70% of global hedge funds. A record 22 foreign companies executed IPO’s on the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq during the first six months of 2007. Only 17
foreign companies did so in the first half of 2000, before SOX was enacted” (Grumet,
2007).
Even though there has not been a significant drop in the number of companies
making the decision to de-list from the American market and turn private or list in
foreign markets due to the increased regulation of Sarbanes-Oxley, there are some who
have and it is actually a benefit to our market. As Braddock claims, “a direct result of
delisting is that the delisted company is less transparent than one that is publicly traded”
(Braddock, 2006, p. 197). Investors can be confident that the publicly traded companies
are transparent in their financial presentation. Investors can clearly determine what
companies are worth investing their hard-earned money in and have confidence that their
funds are secure. With the American market being more rigorously regulated, even with
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slightly fewer publicly traded companies, investors are not exposed to corrupt public
firms.
Affect on Risk Taking Activities of Businesses
Many argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations make companies too risk-averse.
Business is all about taking risks and making deals. With the strict regulations, some
companies don’t jump at new opportunities as easily as they used to. This is not
necessarily a negative affect of SOX as some claim. Senator Sarbanes says that being
risk averse is not always a bad thing. He believes “the rules are forcing companies to
clean up their acts and the unintended consequences are not as many as many people
feared" (Solomon, 2003, p. C1). With the regulations, businesses now are realizing their
responsibility to their shareholders. Sarbanes-Oxley is merely making executives
recognize their responsibility to adequately examine potential business risks.
Arguments Regarding Compliance Costs
One of the main arguments given by those against Sarbanes-Oxley regulations is
the increased compliance costs. This increase in cost is due to many factors. A major
factor is that additional auditing services are typically required as regulations are more
time-consuming and detailed. Management must take on an increased workload in order
to ensure that their company is meeting the new standards. This results in higher
compensation for these managers. The internal control regulations require a separation of
duties between employees which, in the case of most small companies, requires a larger
workforce. Also, Sarbanes-Oxley places limits on the non-audit services that auditors
can perform for their clients. This requires companies to seek council from outside
consulting firms which inevitably increases their expenses (D’Aquila, 2004).
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Additional Auditing Services Affect Costs of Complying With SOX
While additional auditing services may initially be required in order to get
companies in compliance with the regulations, these costs will diminish over time. As
stated in the Financial Executive magazine, “Most audit firms will tell you that there was
a huge, one-time cost to get companies up to speed to meet SOX requirements, but going
forward, things won’t be so costly. There is already some evidence that audit fees are
going down” (Marshall & Heffes, 2006, p. 8). Audit fees were so high in the beginning
because companies did not have proper controls and procedures set up and auditors were
required to spend a lot more time helping clients get these procedures implemented into
company policy. Once set up, these procedures merely have to be evaluated on a yearly
basis which is much less time consuming. As auditors and companies become more
accustomed to Sarbanes-Oxley procedures their costs will decrease as a reflection of that
knowledge.
Costs of Implementing Internal Control Procedures
The costs associated with meeting Section 404 requirements have been the most
controversial. Companies feel that the regulations themselves are too excessive.
However, the PCAOB is focused on enhancing audit quality and many of the critics of
Section 404 are scared of the weaknesses auditors might find in their company’s structure
if they look as closely as SOX demands: “The SEC Final Rules about implementing
section 404 also require that a registrant disclose all ‘significant control deficiencies’ to
its audit committee as well as its external auditors and disclose all ‘material control
weaknesses’ in its Internal Control of Financial Reporting to the public via its periodic
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filings with the SEC” (Gupta, 2006). Thus, one factor in the costs associated with
Section 404 is management’s fear of failure.
Prior studies have documented not only a decline in share price of companies that
report material weaknesses, but also a negative impact of the careers of the
executives responsible. Accordingly, it is in management’s best interest to ensure
that internal controls meet the rigorous standards of SOX before the external
auditors begin their evaluation (Blaskovich, 2007, p. 31).

Therefore, these executives hire consultants to aid them in this compliance which
increases their compliance costs. However, the benefits reaped from ensuring adequate
internal controls can outweigh the potential costs of uncovering material weaknesses and
ruining the company’s reputation. As a survey of auditors from Big Four firms confirms,
“external auditors perceive the involvement of the external consultant as a positive
reflection on management that may result in some reduction of the audit risk for external
auditors” (Blaskovich, 2007, p. 33). This shows that hiring outside consultants to aid in
the compliance efforts is advantageous.
If companies have been properly handling their finances they should have a lot of
the controls already in place. A partner of a Big Four firm stated,
“The costs of complying with SOX are being blown out of proportion as an
excuse to get rid of unwanted oversight. The large majority of internal controls
should be in place, regardless of public reporting requirements, to answer that the
company is safeguarding its assets properly and that the larger organization is
functioning in accordance with senior management’s and the board’s intent” (Hill,
2007).
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Just because a company is not bringing in billions of dollars in revenue annually does not
mean it does not have a responsibility to safeguard the assets of its shareholders.
Often forgotten in this debate is the significant number of smaller businesses that
fail, often because they do not have good business plans or do not identify and control
risks. For example, “Research shows that a strong commitment to internal control is a
matter of company priority, not a matter of resources” (Rittenberg, 2007). Smaller
companies have the ability to install adequate internal controls if they make it a priority.
Research shows “companies that haven’t dedicated sufficient resources to maintain their
internal controls and don’t make it a priority to fix control weaknesses as they arise are
most susceptible to control failures” (Chan, 2006). It is much more cost effective for
these companies to implement internal controls rather than pay for the repercussions of
control failure later on down the road.
Evidence proves that the cost of Section 404 compliance is lessening. The CPA
Journal affirms, “Financial Executives International (FEI) recently studied section 404’s
financial impact on 200 large companies (average annual revenues of $6.8 billion). The
study found that in 2006, these companies spent an average of $2.9 million to comply
with SOX section 404. This figure is 23% lower than in 2005 and on average less than
1% of revenues” (Grumet). These costs are going down every year due to
standardization of control procedures and auditors and companies have become more
efficient at implementing the controls.
Section 404 costs for smaller companies.
Since the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley, smaller public companies have complained
that the costs associated with Section 404 compliance are too extreme. The SEC was
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considerate of the increased financial burden on these companies and has extended the
deadline for smaller public companies to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley multiple times.
The most recent extension is to fiscal years ending after July 2007 (Campbell, 2006).
However, the companies have still not been satisfied. In response, the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations issued an exposure draft in October 2005. This draft addressed
the concerns of the smaller companies and provided guidance as to how they could best
assess the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting.
Smaller public companies must realize that, although the steps to compliance can
be time-consuming, the benefits will outweigh any initial costs. A company’s ability to
have a strong commitment to internal control is based on their priorities, not their
resources (Rittenberg, 2007). If proper controls are set in place, they will build a strong
financial and ethical foundation for the company to grow on. There are many guidelines
and tips smaller companies can follow in order to make the internal control
implementation process easier and more cost-friendly. For example, procrastination in
establishing good internal control will only incur more cost. The risks and deficiencies
must be immediately acknowledged and corrected. Another piece of advice is that
smaller companies do not have to invent a new system. They can learn from what they
have tried in the past and continually work toward improvement. Also, as with all
companies, the controls must start at the top. Management must show a commitment to
ethical practice and a responsibility in establishing effective company policies and
procedures to ensure accurate financial reporting. Once management is on board with
maintaining ethical practices and standards, the mindset of the rest of the company will
conform to the same ideal. If these actions are taken, smaller public companies will be
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thankful for the strong foundation they set for their company and will recognize the
necessity of the compliance cost.
Information Small Companies Can Utilize to Aid in Implementing Section 404
When Section 404 was created, it was a new concept that many found difficult to
understand. Small companies particularly complained because they did not have the
resources to hire extra big-name audit firms to advise them on compliance. In an effort to
aid smaller companies in better understanding the expectations of the PCAOB and SEC
in regards to internal control over financial reporting, Auditing Standard No. 2 was issued
and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations Framework was declared an acceptable
guideline for creating and assessing internal control.
Auditing Standard No. 2
On June 17, 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the
standard set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board known as Auditing
Standard No. 2. This standard is effective for internal control over financial reporting as
required by Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley (Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 2004). It offers guidelines on the requirements of management and auditors when
dealing with assessing internal control over financial reporting.
The purpose of developing internal control is to prevent and mitigate material
financial misstatements. Included in the standard is an explanation that while internal
control is highly effective, it is not absolute assurance that financial misstatements will be
eradicated. This is due to the understanding that humans make errors. It asserts,
“Internal control over financial reporting is a process that involves human diligence and
compliance and is subject to lapses in judgment and breakdowns resulting from human
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failures. Internal control over financial reporting also can be circumvented by collusion
or improper management override” (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
2004). While these limitations are inevitable, a strong system of internal control will
reduce this risk.
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
Issued in 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) framework
was developed to assess the effectiveness of controls. The COSO framework is a
“process designed to provide reasonable assurance of effectiveness and efficiency of
operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations” (Callaghan, 2007, p. 59). With the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley, the COSO
framework has been declared an acceptable framework for evaluating internal controls
over financial reporting by the SEC. It is specifically noted in Auditing Standard No. 2
as an acceptable framework to set and assess internal control. As noted earlier, COSO
also issued an exposure draft after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed that was specific for
smaller companies and aiding them in implementing this framework in their businesses.
The framework is compiled of five components of internal control. The first
component is the control environment. The evaluation of this control is critical because it
affects every aspect of the business. This is a reflection of management’s knowledge and
dedication to setting and maintaining accurate controls and ethics throughout the
company. This is called the “tone at the top” approach. The idea is that top executives
should set an ethical standard that will permeate the rest of the company (Callaghan,
2007). According to research by the Institute of Internal Auditors, “companies perform
better and last longer when top management makes a commitment to strong internal
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control and clearly conveys this through their actions” (Institute of Internal Auditors,
2005, p. 2). If a company teaches their employees the importance of controls they will
have a much easier time implementing and evaluating their internal control system.
The second component of the COSO framework is risk assessment. Management
must identify and evaluate the risks that have the potential to keep the company from
achieving corporate goals. Next, control activities must be established in order to ensure
the company is taking the necessary steps to mitigate risk and reach objectives. These
control activities can include but are not limited to segregation of duties, management
oversight, and proper documentation of policies and procedures. Information and
communication systems are the next component which enables the company to collect
and manage the information needed to conduct its control activities. Finally, the
company must monitor the effectiveness of its internal control system (Rittenberg, 2007).
Management’s Report on Internal Control
Once a company has implemented a framework for internal control procedures
(ICOFR), management and the internal auditor must report on the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting. The SEC requires management to disclose four
statements in its report on internal control.
1. A statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining
adequate ICOFR.
2. A statement identifying the framework used by management to evaluate the
effectiveness of ICOFR.
3. Management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s ICOFR as of
the end of its most recent fiscal year, including an explicit statement as to
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whether that control is effective, and disclosure of any material weaknesses
identified.
4. A statement that the registered public accounting firm that audited the
financial statements has also issued an attestation report on management’s
internal control assessment (Agami, 2006).
Similarly, the auditor must report on “management’s assessment of the effectiveness of
ICOFR; and the auditor’s independent assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s
ICOFR” (Agami, 2006). If the auditor does not find any material weaknesses in the
company’s ICOFR or the auditor and management both report a material weakness and
are taking the steps to correct it, the auditor can give an unqualified opinion. However, if
the auditor found a material weakness and management did not; the auditor must then
issue an adverse opinion. As stated earlier, management may determine that a significant
deficiency or a material weakness is present in its internal control procedures. If a
material weakness exists, management and the auditor must report that the company’s
system of internal control is not effective (Agami, 2006).
Ways to Create Value from Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations
With all the debate surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations many companies
are simply trying to get by without going bankrupt or getting into trouble with the SEC.
If companies keep this mindset they will never see the benefits that can be derived from
these regulations. However, if companies view implementing and complying with
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations as more than a “let’s do the least amount of work we can that
will allow us to say we followed the rules” attitude, they will recognize lasting benefits.
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The CPA Journal came out with five keys to create value from Sarbanes-Oxley.
The first is to appreciate the goal behind Sarbanes-Oxley. The second is to understand
the fraud disease. Thirdly, aggressively address ethical attitudes and the potential for
rationalizing fraud. Fourth, consciously decide to go beyond simple compliance to
improve governance and controls. Lastly, investigate and implement enterprise risk
management (Beasley, 2004). If small companies follow these steps to creating value
from Sarbanes-Oxley, they will have no need for exemption. They will be thankful they
have the regulations in place as their corporate structure and public reputation will be
stronger.
Appreciate the Goal Behind Sarbanes-Oxley
The first way companies can recognize value from Sarbanes-Oxley is to
appreciate the overriding purpose behind its creation. Executives must realize that while
they themselves may be conducting business with the utmost integrity, others are not.
They must realize that when viewed from an all-inclusive perspective, the regulations
will foster a much stronger market for the American economy in general. It is important
that top management make this a priority. Otherwise, employees will not recognize it as
being a necessity.
Understand the Fraud Disease
In order to see benefits from an Act made to decrease the occurrence of fraud,
management must understand how and why fraud happens. As stated in Auditing: A
Journal of Practice & Theory, the recipe for fraud has three components: incentive,
opportunity, and attitude/rationalization (Beasley, 2004).
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Incentive.
For anyone to commit fraud, he or she must first have some type of motivation or
incentive. This can come from a number of factors. It could be from a desire for greater
compensation whether it is to steal money directly or distort figures in order to meet sales
figures that trigger a bonus. Another factor would be a motivation to perform to a certain
level or to meet expectations placed on the company. Executives must realize these
incentives if they want to eliminate them.
Opportunity.
Executives must realize that perpetrators of fraud cannot complete their mission if
they never have an opportunity to do so because “the main deterrent to opportunity is
strong internal controls, the focus of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” (Beasley,
2004). Good internal controls will eliminate opportunity to get away with fraud. Internal
controls should be designed so that fraud will be automatically detected.
Attitude/Rationalization.
This component asks whether a person who has incentive and opportunity to
commit fraud will somehow give an excuse for his or her actions. Some excuses include
saving jobs or that it will only happen once and will be corrected in the future. This is the
hardest component to combat because it is an unobservable mind-set.
Aggressively Address Ethical Attitudes and the Potential for Rationalizing Fraud
The best way to aid in eliminating the possibility of rationalization is to instill a
solid ethical attitude within the company. This again should start with top management
(Callaghan, 2007). If employees see that executives are aggressive at maintaining ethical
standards, they will be compelled to follow suit.
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The CPA Journal offers four questions that companies need to address when
considering their ethical attitude: Does the company have clearly defined ethical
boundaries that are communicated to employees? How would others describe the
company’s ethical boundaries relative to the gray zone and the black zone? What types
of accountabilities are present for those who suffer an ethical lapse? Does top
management’s day-to-day behavior support or undermine the stated ethical attitude and
boundaries? (Beasley, 2004). If companies consider their responses to these questions,
they will get a better understanding of the ethical attitude and potential for fraud within
their company.
Beyond Compliance: Improving Governance and Controls
If companies will do more than just the bare minimum necessary for SarbanesOxley compliance, they will realize a much greater benefit. Companies must not view
the regulations as a burdensome task but rather an opportunity to improve their corporate
structure and build a stronger financial future. Companies wanting to gain the greatest
benefit from Sarbanes-Oxley should take two important steps. The first is instead of just
making the required structural changes to their executive boards and committees; they
should explore governance best practices to enhance their own governance processes.
The second step is to use the work done for Section 404 internal controls to actually
improve their controls. They should examine and question every detail of their controls
and procedures to see what is necessary, what is not working, and what could be added
that would be more beneficial (Beasley, 2004).
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Investigate and Implement Enterprise Risk Management
Enterprise Risk Management is defined by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations exposure draft as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors,
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
entity objectives” (Beasley, 2004, p. 13). This framework was designed to aid companies
in discovering what activities are prohibiting objectives from being reached. Using this
framework will aid companies in getting the most out of their Section 404 compliance
work.
Making Section 404 Compliance Cost-Effective
Not only is it possible to create value out of Section 404 compliance, it can be
done in a cost-effective manner. The CPA Journal listed nine tips on implementing
effective internal control while working with a budget. The first tip is to not
procrastinate. If issues are addressed promptly, they will be less of a hassle later on. The
second tip is to not try and reinvent your entire control procedures. Build a plan based on
things you learned from initial compliance efforts. Next, allocate the right resources to
the project. Create a compliance team with the right talents and skills needed to
accomplish the job.
The fourth tip is to make sure top management shows their support. This will
inspire others to get on board. Next, use a risk-based approach. This helps to properly
plan the compliance activities. Another tip is to make a plan. Draw a timeline of your
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projects with reasonable due dates and goals. Next, provide adequate training to your
staff to make them knowledgeable of the needs and expectations.
The next tip is to remedy control issues as soon as they arise. Waiting only makes
them more costly and potentially damaging. Lastly, ensure timely evaluation and
discussion of challenges faced along the way and how to resolve them (Chan, 2006). All
of these tips will aid companies, small ones in particular, in developing and implementing
proper internal controls without going bankrupt.
Evidence That Sarbanes-Oxley Is Effective
It has been five years since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and we are
now able to more adequately determine its effectiveness in fulfilling its intended purpose.
In assessing the Act’s performance, its positive effects must be weighed against the costs
incurred to create those results. Sarbanes-Oxley is only effective if its benefits outweigh
its costs.
Transparency of Financial Reports
One unmistakable benefit is the transparency of financial reports created by the
increase in independence of auditors from company management. Auditors have realized
their duty is to provide investors with a clear depiction of a company’s financial position
rather than to please executives. By demanding auditor independence, investors can be
confident that the financial reports they are given are based on accurate measures of
company performance. They no longer have to worry as much that the numbers they see
on paper are skewed so that the executives and auditors can make their profit projections
which are linked to their bonus package. A survey was taken to question auditors on
whether they believed Sarbanes-Oxley would increase investor confidence. The survey
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showed that “nearly seven out of ten auditors agree that investors and creditors should
have greater confidence in financial statements because of SOX” (Hill, 2007). This helps
to show that one of Sarbanes-Oxley’s main goals is being accomplished.
Weaknesses in Corporate Structure
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations have also opened the eyes of corporations to
weaknesses in their corporate structure and encouraged them to make positive company
changes. Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman William H. Donaldson
affirmed that 200 out of 2,500 companies who filed internal control reports found
material weaknesses in those controls. Many of those weaknesses caused errors in their
financial statements as a result (Swartz, 2005, p. 23).

As management recognizes these

weaknesses, it can take the necessary steps to correct them thereby improving and
strengthening the external view of the company. This information gathered for
compliance purposes can be utilized in other areas of the business to ultimately affect
overall performance.
Public Market Performance
There is little room for doubt that Sarbanes-Oxley has strengthened our public
market and restored confidence in investors. As noted in the CPA Journal, “While SOX
may have negatively affected the earnings of certain corporations, the best argument in
favor of the law comes from simply looking at the performance of our financial markets.
Between July 30, 2002, and June 30, 2007, the Standard & Poor’s 500 has increased
67%, representing about $4.2 trillion in market value” (Grumet, 2007). These numbers
are staggering and give evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley is accomplishing its goals.
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Material Internal Control Weaknesses
Another surprising number is the percentage of companies reporting material
weaknesses of internal control from the first year of compliance compared to the second.
In 2005, 15.4% of companies reported internal control weaknesses. In 2006, that
percentage dropped to 5.6% (Rittenberg, 2007). This again proves that the arguments
that Sarbanes-Oxley is costly and ineffective are unsupported.
Many companies fail because they do not have solid business plans or they do not
identify and manage risks. Establishing good internal control over financial reporting
will strengthen companies and diminish the chance of financial failure. The difficulty
companies have with setting strong internal controls is not in the expense but rather in the
necessity to make it a priority (Rittenberg, 2007). Executives do not want to spend their
time setting up a policy on ethical procedures. They often feel it is unnecessary and that
it’s not an issue top management must deal with. Also, many of them do not have any
ethical standards set for themselves so it would seem worthless to them to set ethical
standards for their business. However, as stated earlier ethical and responsible behavior
must start at the top with the executives. Management must realize that the benefits of
establishing good internal control procedures greatly outweigh any costs incurred to
develop and implement them in the long run.
Restatements by Small Capital Firms
Another benefit is that the small capital firms are now being looked at by the
PCAOB. AuditAnalytics, a company that analyzes audit problems, reported that in 2005
the number of companies filing restatements was up 72% from the previous year.
However, clients of the most well known, large audit firms were filing 31% fewer
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restatements during this time period. How could these two percentages coexist? The
increased percentage in audit restatements came from the small capital companies, whose
number of restatements more than doubled during this time period (Norris, 2006). Before
Sarbanes-Oxley, these companies were regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission which was very limited in authority and staff. The SEC did not have
enough time or resources to look over every large audit firm much less review the audits
of tiny public firms. Now, under Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, the PCAOB inspects every
firm that audits public companies at least once every three years. This regulation is
causing these firms to look more closely at the details and provide investors with quality
audit reports for every public company regardless of size.
Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was installed in an attempt to protect investors
by better regulating financial reporting. While this purpose is being fulfilled on a slow
but consistent basis, small and foreign companies are seeking exemption from the
regulations due to increased compliance costs, effects on the public market, and the
effects on risk taking of public companies. While compliance costs have been
considerable, the benefits cannot be overlooked. Investor confidence in management,
auditors, and financial reporting has been restored. It has encouraged investors to
continue trusting the U.S. public market with its finances. Allowing these select
companies to be exempt from the Act would ultimately contradict its purpose. These
companies must realize their costs of compliance are miniscule compared to the risk of
losing their entire capital when investors no longer trust their financial reports.
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Companies must recognize the potential value in Sarbanes-Oxley in order to reap
the benefits. Companies that view the regulations as a burden and as one more test they
must pass, will see little payback. However, if companies view Sarbanes-Oxley as an
opportunity to strengthen their corporate structure and solidify their reputation in the
public market they will see long-lasting results. They will also be above the curve at
mitigating fraud and financial reporting discrepancies. This is true regardless of the size
of the company.
Sarbanes-Oxley has now been in place for five years and its initial critics are
running out of arguments against it. Small companies were given multiple extensions for
meeting the SOX regulations and were also given lots of detailed instructions and aids on
how to meet compliance standards without having to pay high-priced audit firms to teach
them. Any regulation of its size is inevitably going to have an initial cost burden and
need continuous evaluation. However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is proving its value as it
matures.
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